Articles Discussing General Issues Under Title VII.

Plaintiff-employees cannot pursue a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983) for rights created under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, the federal appeals court in Philadelphia has held in a case of first impression for the Third Circuit. Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, et al., No. 16-4383 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2017). The Court joins seven other circuits to have considered the issue and came to the same conclusion.

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified its standard relating to rescinding terminations, and more specifically, how they interpret “adverse consequences.” The issue came before the court in a matter where an employee returned from her honeymoon, visibly pregnant, and was told that her position was going to be eliminated within a few weeks. Shortly thereafter, the employee retained an attorney and notified her employer of the same. Several days later, the employer rescinded her termination and reinstated her position. When analyzing rescinding termination claims under Title VII, the standard is to determine if the reinstatement had any lasting “adverse consequences.” Various circuit courts and lower courts have historically considered whether the employee was restored to the same salary, benefits, and title when reinstated in order to determine if there were adverse consequences to the employee. If the same material conditions were reinstated, courts would not recognize adverse consequences. Here, the employee did not claim any difference in salary, title, or benefits and therefore, the lower court ruled that the employee incurred no adverse consequences.

On May 19, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in CRST, Inc. v. EEOC, which addressed the definition of a “prevailing party” who may be awarded attorneys’ fees in Title VII cases. Although the Court ultimately remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit on other grounds, it unanimously held that a favorable ruling on the merits of a Title VII case is “not a necessary predicate to find that a defendant has prevailed.” A boon to employers, this decision enables defendants to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under Title VII for frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless claims when such claims are disposed of on any grounds, regardless of whether those grounds are merit-based or procedural.

In Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (which has jurisdiction over North and South Carolina) joined the majority of federal appellate courts in holding that multiple entities may simultaneously be considered the employers of an employee for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

A paid suspension “typically” does not constitute an “adverse employment action” under the substantive provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Section 703), the federal appeals court in Philadelphia has held in a case of first impression for the circuit, joining other courts that have ruled on the issue. Jones v. SEPTA, No. 14-3814, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14094 (3d Cir. Aug. 12, 2015). The Court, however, declined to address whether a paid suspension could constitute an adverse employment action in the retaliation context under Title VII (Section 704). The Third Circuit has jurisdiction over Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

At the end of the Supreme Court’s term in June, we blogged about a housing discrimination case that might be used by employers to limit disparate impact liability. Texas Dept. of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). Less than two months later, a divided three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit cited Inclusive Communities’ limitations in an employment matter. Abril-Rivera v. Johnson (1st Cir. July 30, 2015).

In Tolbert v. Smith, No. 14-1012-cv, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10656 (2d Cir. June 24, 2015), the Second Circuit issued a decision holding that extending a probationary term instead of granting a teacher tenure constitutes an adverse employment action sufficient to support a claim for race discrimination — the fact that the teacher is provided with another year of probationary employment notwithstanding. The court noted that offering a fourth year of probation is intertwined with a denial of tenure, which amounts to the “denial of a material improvement in the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment” — since the benefits of having received tenure are denied, including benefits such as termination only for cause. Accordingly, such a refusal of a material employment benefit for a discriminatory reason is violative of the civil rights statutes.

In 2014 regulators increased their focus on the content of employee confidentiality, settlement and separation agreements. In particular, these regulators have expressed concern about clauses in agreements that may be construed as preventing an individual from cooperating or communicating with an investigatory agency.

A decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on whether and to what extent a court may enforce the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) mandatory duty to conciliate discrimination claims before filing suit could significantly change the landscape of EEOC litigation for employers. The court will hear the case during its 2014–2015 term, and its decision has the potential to prevent federal courts from reviewing pre-suit conciliation efforts. This would, in effect, allow the EEOC to proceed unchecked with respect to conciliation. It could also result in less productive conciliation and increased litigation for employers. More importantly, such an outcome would deprive employers of any meaningful recourse in the event that the EEOC’s conciliation efforts are not made in good faith.

On October 7, 2014, District Judge John Darrah of the North District of Illinois dismissed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s lawsuit against CVS Pharmacy. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., civil action no. 1:14-cv-00863, (N.D. Ill, October 7, 2014) (“10/7/2014 Memorandum and Order”). This lawsuit has been the subject of significant media attention due to the EEOC’s challenge to common provisions included in many standard severance agreements. While the decision is helpful for employers in that the EEOC did not prevail in this initial effort, the decision leaves many questions unanswered regarding the EEOC’s recent enforcement efforts and the appropriate employer response to the EEOC’s actions.

This summer marked the 50th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, legislation first introduced by President John F. Kennedy in response to the growing civil rights movement. For employers, the most important component of the act is Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion. A number of landmark decisions, legislation, and executive orders have broadened the scope of Title VII and resulted in greater protection for women and minorities in the workplace.

Employers often use waivers and releases of claims in agreements with former employees, either as part of a separation agreement at the time employment ends or in a settlement agreement after a former employee has raised claims against the employer. Both of these types of agreements have garnered attention lately, serving as a reminder of some best practice approaches in each context.

Members of the House and Senate on Thursday introduced legislation that would effectively overturn last year’s U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Vance v. Ball State University. In Vance, the Court held that an employee is not a “supervisor” – and therefore does not subject the employer to vicarious liability under Title VII for the employee’s actions – unless the employee is empowered to take tangible employment actions against other employees. The Fair Employment Protection Act (H.R.4227, S. 2133) introduced in the House by Reps. George Miller (D-CA) and Rosa DeLauro (D-CT), and in the Senate by Sen. Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), “corrects the error in the Vance decision and clarifies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as other federal antidiscrimination statutes, who counts as a ‘supervisor’ for the purpose of holding employers responsible for unlawful harassment.”

On February 7, 2014, the Chicago District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against CVS Pharmacy, Inc., claiming that a severance agreement used by the company violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it is “overly broad, misleading and unenforceable….” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., civil action no. 14-cv-863 (N.D. Ill., February 7, 2014). This ASAP will address the background to this lawsuit, describe the EEOC’s new and aggressive position toward severance agreements, and provide recommendations for employers.

On February 7, 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) sued CVS Pharmacy Inc. in federal court in Chicago to invalidate the company’s standard severance agreement. The lawsuit raises concerns because it attacks language that employers commonly use in severance agreements.