Total Articles: 23
Ogletree Deakins • October 05, 2011
At the start of the year, I noted that one thing that seemed to be a "trend" was litigation by non-minority plaintiffs. See, 2011 -- the Year of the Non-Minority?
Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLP • August 26, 2011
An office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued a "Document Retention Notice" that appears to be designed to turn meritless cases into spoliation claims. This is another example of how the EEOC has turned itself into a prosecutorial agency with no real pretense of impartiality. Employers need to respond accordingly.
Barker Olmsted & Barnier • May 11, 2011
What does it mean to hold an employer liable for discrimination under a “cat’s paw” theory of liability? The concept has been addressed in court decisions for a number of years, and recently the U.S. Supreme Court addressed it in a military service discrimination case titled Straub v. Proctor Hospital.
Shaw Valenza LLP • May 05, 2011
In light of a recent United States Court decision, Staub v. Proctor Hospital, careful employers should consider requiring a review of lower-level managers’ and supervisors’ recommendations to terminate or take other actions against employees. A review allows more responsible managers to detect ill-motivated decisions that could turn into legal claims. Senior managers, uninvolved in the day-to-day supervision of an employee, can lend a degree of objectivity. They also ensure consistent application of company policies. Depending on the level of scrutiny, a second or third-level review can also ensure proper documentation identify “red flags” and assess potential risks.
Vedder Price • April 22, 2011
In our July 2009 newsletter, we highlighted then- recent decisions evaluating the “cat’s paw” theory of liability in discrimination cases. Under that theory, an employer can be liable for discrimination where the supervisor who harbored discriminatory animus towards the plaintiff influenced an adverse action, but did not in fact make the ultimate
Nexsen Pruet • April 01, 2011
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that an employer can be held liable for employment discrimination based upon the discriminatory animus of a supervisor who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment decision. Staub v. Proctor Hospital, No. 09-400 (S.Ct. March 1, 2011). The case is an important one for employers, who can now be liable for discrimination where the decision-maker who takes the adverse employment action against the employee has no discriminatory animus if he or she is relying upon recommendations of a supervisor who does.
Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLP • March 23, 2011
Remember being a 1L, studying about Mrs. Palsgraf and proximate cause in torts and the fruit of the poisonous tree in criminal procedure? I never thought I would see them again, but I was wrong. The ideas popped up the SCOTUS decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.
Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLP • March 15, 2011
Many employers are scratching their heads about last week’s “cat’s paw” decision from the Supreme Court. The Court unanimously held that employers can be liable for decisions that were influenced by managers or supervisors who had unlawful motives. However, the decision was short on advice about how to avoid “cat’s paw” liability.
Franczek Radelet P.C • March 04, 2011
On March 1, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Staub v. Proctor Hospital (.pdf) that an employer can, in certain circumstances, be held liable for employment discrimination based upon the bias of a supervisor who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment decision. The Court struck down a narrow version of this so-called “cat’s paw” argument, under which the employer could be held liable only if the biased supervisor exerted a “singular influence” over the ultimate employment decision. Unfortunately, the Court’s decision provides little guidance for employers as to what steps they can take to avoid liability for “cat’s paw” claims.
Franczek Radelet P.C • March 04, 2011
On March 1, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Staub v. Proctor Hospital (.pdf) that an employer can be held liable for employment discrimination claims based upon the bias of a supervisor who influenced, but did not make the final employment decision. The Court struck down a narrow version of this so-called “cat’s paw” argument, under which the employer could be held liable only if the biased supervisor exerted a “singular influence” over the ultimate employment decision. It is clear that this ruling will apply broadly to cases including claims of retaliation and interference under the FMLA. Unfortunately, the Court’s decision provides little guidance for employers as to what steps they can take to avoid liability for “cat’s paw” claims.
Ogletree Deakins • March 04, 2011
he U.S. Supreme Court has held, by unanimous opinion, that an employer may be held liable for employment discrimination under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) based on the “discriminatory animus” of an employee who influenced, but did not make, an ultimate employment decision. In interpreting the so-called "cat's paw" theory of liability, the Court declined to adopt the approach suggested by the employer: that a decision-maker's independent investigation and rejection of an employee's allegations of discriminatory animus should negate the effect of any prior discrimination in subsequent actions against that employee. Instead, the Court held that "if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA."
Ford & Harrison LLP • March 03, 2011
The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the standards under which an employer can be liable for discrimination under the so-called "cat's paw"[1] theory of liability in a discrimination claim. See Staub v. Proctor Hospital, No. 09-400 (March 1, 2011). The Court held that if a supervisor performs an act motivated by unlawful animus and intends to cause an adverse employment action, the employer is liable if the supervisor's act is a proximate cause of the adverse decision even if the decision maker did not share the supervisor's animus. The decision was issued in a case brought under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), but its holding will likely be applied in cases under Title VII and other discrimination statutes.
Jackson Lewis LLP • March 03, 2011
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled unanimously that employers may be subject to liability in employment discrimination cases even if the ultimate decision to take an adverse employment action was made by a manager who was not biased toward the affected employee.
Fisher & Phillips, LLP • March 02, 2011
On March 1, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer may be liable for the discriminatory motives of a supervisor who influences but does not make the ultimate employment decision. The Court's ruling will impact employment discrimination claims where multiple individuals are claimed to have made, caused, or influenced the ultimate employment decision.
Ogletree Deakins • March 02, 2011
Although viewed as one of THE most conservative justices, I am not sure anyone who is very knowledgeable about employment law relishes the idea of Judge Scalia writing the majority opinion in an employment law case. If they did before this term, their view would be strongly challenged by today's decision in Staub v. Proctor (S.Ct. 3.1.11) [pdf] and coupled with his earlier opinion in Thompson v. North American Stainless, should readily disabuse them of that notion.
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP • February 03, 2010
President Obamas Chief of Staff has caused quite a stir. Reportedly, in a fit of frustration, Rahm Emanuel called participants in a White House meeting f---ing retarded. Sarah Palin, who has a son with Downs Syndrome, quickly spoke out about the inappropriate nature of the comment on Facebook. The statement drew additional attention because this is the second time that a member of the Obama Administration has had to apologize for making an insensitive comment regarding the mentally disabled.
Ogletree Deakins • March 04, 2008
The U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn. This case raises the important issue of whether so-called "me too" evidence can be introduced in employment discrimination litigation. The high court failed to answer this question, however, deferring to district courts to evaluate whether the probative value of such evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect.
Vedder Price • February 28, 2008
A recurrent issue in employment discrimination cases is whether me too evidencetestimony by other employees that they have been discriminated against by supervisors who did not make the decision being challenged by the plaintiffcan be introduced to prove discrimination against the plaintiff.
Ford & Harrison LLP • February 28, 2008
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that testimony by non-parties to a lawsuit claiming they were subject to discrimination by individuals other than those accused in the lawsuit is neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible. See Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn (February 26, 2008). In Sprint, the Court held that the relevance and prejudice of this evidence must be determined in the context of the facts and arguments in a particular case.
In this case, Mendelsohn claimed she was chosen for discharge during a reduction in force (RIF) because of her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). At trial, she sought to introduce the testimony of other former employees who claimed they were subjected to age discrimination while they were employed by Sprint. However, none of these employees worked in the same business unit as Mendelsohn and none claimed to have been subjected to discrimination by any of the supervisors in Mendelsohns chain of command, including the individual who made the decision to discharge her.
Fisher & Phillips, LLP • February 27, 2008
Today the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Sprint v. Mendelsohn reinforcing its long standing rule that district courts are afforded wide discretion on evidentiary matters. Practitioners were disappointed that the Court provided little, if any, guidance on the substantive issue before it. Instead the decision focuses more on the deference that appellate courts must give to the decisions of lower federal district courts, and holds only that admission of "me too" evidence is fact based and "depends on many factors...."
Ballard Rosenberg Golper & Savitt • August 01, 2007
In Poland v. Chertoff, James Poland, a long-standing employee of the U.S. Customs Service based in Portland, Oregon, complained of age discrimination against his supervisor, Gary Hillberry.
Vedder Price • August 04, 2006
Reports of employee misconduct from a manager
without authority to impose discipline are considered by some employers to be a risk-free basis for
disciplining the employee. The decisionmaker need
only show that he reasonably believed the managers
report and acted accordingly. Whatever bias may
have prompted the manager to act is not imputed to
the decisionmaker unless he knows of the bias.
Ballard Rosenberg Golper & Savitt • August 15, 2002
The Seventh Circuit upheld a ruling in favor of a school district where the plaintiff's expert statistical witness failed to use reliable statistics to show bias.